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In the recent past, many economies, attempting to become more open, have adopted 
policies fostering a less restrictive trade regime. In their attempts to become more open, 
policy makers can, with the best of intentions, adopt policies that have unforeseen and 
often undesirable side effects. In the 1980s, Australia was in the process of converting 
quotas to tariffs. In the process they auctioned off import quota licenses in order to use 
the submitted bids to calculate equivalent tariff rates. A security deposit was charged to 
prevent frivolous bidding.  The collection of security deposits may be seen as a harmless 
policy with the only discernable cost being the opportunity cost of the funds while they 
are on deposit. We argue that, at least in the Australian context, this is not so. Using data 
from a middleman in the secondary market for these licenses, we show that the policy 
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In the recent past, many economies, attempting to become more open, have 
adopted policies fostering a less restrictive trade regime. In their attempts to become 
more open, policy makers can, with the best of intentions, adopt policies that have 
unforeseen and often undesirable side effects. Australia, New Zealand and Colombia in 
1980s and 90s, attempted a gradual phase out of quantitative restrictions by converting 
quotas to equivalent tariffs followed by a reduction in these tariffs. This was undertaken 
by auctioning import quota licenses and using the auction prices as a source of 
information for setting equivalent tariffs. Auctions of import licenses have also been 
suggested as a means to phase out negotiated quota arrangements such as the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement (MFA).  
 
In Australia, bidders (who participated in a series of uniform price auctions) 
offered to pay, not a price for the license, but an ad-valorem tariff in excess of the base 
rate, or the premium for short.
2 These licenses were transferable and a few brokers 
coordinated transactions in the secondary market. When auctioning quota licenses, the 
authorities wanted to discourage frivolous bidders as well as ensure that allocated 
licenses were claimed and utilized. To prevent frivolous bidding, only registered bidders 
could bid in the auction
3. To ensure utilization and discourage hoarding, security deposits 
were collected upon acceptance of the allocation.  These deposits were refunded when the 
licenses were used. The collection of security deposits may be seen as a harmless policy 
with the only discernable cost being the opportunity cost of the funds while they are on 
deposit. We argue that, at least in the Australian context, this is not so.  
 
In Australia, through the late part of 80s, a security deposit of 10% was charged. 
The security deposit rate was cut to 5% in 1992. We use this natural experiment and data 
on the behavior of a single middleman in 1989 and 1992 to analyze the effects of the 
security deposit policy. Our analysis suggests that cutting the deposit rate reduced 
                                                 
2 Note that as a result, any change in macroeconomic conditions would be reflected in the premium bid in 
equilibrium, not in the license price in the secondary market. 
3 Bidders who failed to pick up their allocations were banned from registering in subsequent auctions. inefficiency in the secondary market as measured by welfare relative to perfect 
competition. In 1989, there were fewer trades (buys and sells) than in 1992 and these 
trades occurred at a higher price on average. Our estimates suggest that the higher 
security deposit changed the distribution of prices offered by the buyers and sellers who 
came to the middleman, and thereby the behavior of the middleman. This generated the 
rise in price and fall in trades that occurred. 
 
Our work is related to the literature on middlemen and their role in 
intermediation. Middlemen trade in a product but neither produce nor consume it 
themselves. They make their money by buying low and selling high. The need for 
middlemen arises when markets are thin, so that potential buyers and sellers find it 
difficult to meet directly and conduct trades. In such circumstances, therefore, middlemen 
serve an important need: they facilitate trade. However, when markets are thin, 
middlemen also have the ability to influence the terms on which trades occur. They 
introduce a wedge between the buying price and the selling price of the product. This 
wedge limits the extent to which they facilitate trade.   
 
Hall and Rust (2002) study the middleman problem in the context of a steel 
service center, which purchases large quantities of steel on the wholesale market for 
subsequent resale in the retail market at a mark-up. They utilize a generalized (S, s) setup, 
where the middleman buys steel at an exogenous price from the wholesale market 
whenever his inventory falls below a certain level (s) so as to bring his inventory back to 
the target level, S. At the same time, he sets his retail price to generate sales for the 
product. Their model is a stationary one and is estimated using Simulated Maximum 
Likelihood methods. In their data, similar to ours, they do not observe prices when the 
middleman does not transact. This biases the sample. They solve for this endogenous 
sampling problem by censoring their distributions.  
 
In our problem, unlike that of Rust and Hall, there is no wholesale market for 
quota licenses, so bulk-breaking is not a major function of the quota broker. In addition, 
unlike the steel market, there is no observable spot price for quota licenses and the inventory holding cost, which is an important variable for the steel intermediary, is 
negligible in the case of a quota broker. Most important, the fact that quota licenses are 
valid only for a certain period of time (usually twelve months) makes any model of 
middlemen trading in them intrinsically non stationary.  
 
As a result, much of the existing theoretical work on middleman behavior cannot 
be readily applied to this setting. For example, Spulber (1996) and Hall and Rust (2003) 
model middleman behavior using a search-theoretic framework. In such models, 
middlemen are treated as agents who set bid and ask prices, depending on their type 
(which is often identified with their cost); when buyers (sellers) meet a middleman, they 
may choose either to buy from (sell to) him, or to continue searching for a better match. 
Such models, however, restrict attention to time independent bid-ask prices. Since quota 
licenses expire after a certain period, the problem of quota brokers is inherently time 
dependent. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 sets out a basic 
framework for the quota broker's problem. Section 1.3 describes the data. Sections 1.4 
and 1.5 discuss the empirical model and estimation strategy. Section 1.6 talks about the 
results of the estimation and conducts a welfare analysis using simulations. Section 1.7 
concludes. Appendix at the end contains a detailed description of the estimation 
procedure and tables. 
 
1.2   The Model 
 
We term the middleman's potential customers, importers. There are many 
importers (a continuum of them) and few middlemen. Importers import the restricted 
product (say, clothing) and sell them to buyers (retailers or final consumers). In order to 
import one unit of clothing, the importer requires one quota license. Assume that each 
importer is matched to a buyer only quite rarely. As a result, when an importer obtains an 
order, he treats it as if it is the only order he will get for the quota period (say, twelve 
months). This sidesteps having to model the search behavior of the importer. He needs to 
move quickly to fill the order and visits one of the few middlemen. As the secondary market quota license prices are not centrally posted, he chooses one middleman at 
random.  
 
Each day, with probability λ , a middleman meets one such importer who arrives 
with a buying or selling offer. An offer is a price quantity pair. Conditional on meeting, 
with probability  ,  the middleman gets an opportunity to buy   at a price   where 
the price quantity pair is drawn from a log normal distribution, i.e.   
; With probability  , he gets to sell   at price     where  
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B I   is drawn from a Bernoulli distribution 
each period with parameter  . Let  
B λ 1 = I   indicate he meets an importer while   0 = I   
indicates he doesn't; I  is drawn from a Bernoulli distribution each period with parameter 
λ . Thus in any period, the probability of having an option to buy is given by     the 
probability of having an option to sell is given by     and the probability of 
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. 1 λ −   Given an offer, the middleman can either say Yes (Y) 
or No (N). 
 
Define  (   such that     and     when the middleman has an offer 
to sell and    ,     when the middleman buys. To any choice of Yes or No, 
there may be a non pecuniary aspect which we represent by  
) q p,
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S q q =
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1 ω  for Yes and     2 ω  for No. 
Let  ) , ( 2 1 ω ω ω ≡   be drawn independently from a distribution every time period. To 
simplify notation later, define  . 2 1 ω ω δ − =  Let     be the middleman's beginning of 
period stock. The stock constrains what the middleman can sell. 
S
 
  Figure 1.1 gives a schematic display of the model. Note that in our formulation 
the random variables in period     do not affect random variables in     because of our 
independence assumptions. Given the realizations of 
t 1 + t
p  and  , the middleman’s decision 
to say Yes or No depends on the payoffs of doing so. Let     be the value from 
q
(.)
  Y Vsaying Y. First note that the middleman cannot sell more than his stock. So define 
. Recall that when the middleman chooses to buy,   has been defined to 
be negative. Since stock S is always positive, 
) , ( S q Min q = ′ q
q′ may be different from   only in the 
case of a sale. If the middleman sells, he receives revenue  . Note that since in the case 
of buying,   is negative,   is negative, that is, there is a current period monetary cost. 




' q S − .  Let Q (S,t: ) denote 
the expected value of the stock S to the middleman at the beginning of the period t 
(before the realization of any random variables) given the parameters of the distribution 
represented by    W e  a s s u m e  t h e r e  i s  n o  
discounting. 
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The value  from saying No is 
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In this case, the stock stays the same and the only current period payoff is what comes 
from the non pecuniary aspect. Given these payoffs of saying “Y” or “No”, the 
middleman chooses the option which gives him the higher payoff. Thus   
] , [ ) , , , , (
N Y V V MAX S t q p V = ω                    (3) 
where V(.) is the value function conditional of meeting an importer.  
Finally the expected value at the beginning of the period Q(.,.) depends on the probability 
of meeting, possible realizations of offers and  ωs. Hence 
) : 1 , ( * ) 1 ( ) , , , , ( ) : , ( Ω + − + ∗ = Ω t S Q S t q p EV t S Q j j j λ ω λ        (4) 
where the expectations are taken over prices, quantity and the ωs. With probability λ  he 
may meet an importer and be called upon to make a choice of Yes or No; otherwise he 
moves to the next period with same stock. 
 
This is a finite horizon dynamic optimization problem. While the algorithm to 
solve it is rather simple (solving backwards from the last period), there is no analytical 
solution. Solving it would require us to calculate V for every possible realization of p, q, ω and S at every point in time. Given that for our empirical exercise, we do not know 
what the parameters of the distributions are, the problem has to be solved repeatedly for a 
large range of values of the unknown parameters. This is likely to be an extremely time 
consuming exercise. For these reasons, we look for an alternate way of estimating the 
model without explicitly solving the dynamic programming problem. We follow the 
approach of Geweke and Keane (2000). 
Define 
N Y V V S t q p Z − ≡ ) , , , , ( ω                    (5) 
 
Substituting the value of  VY and  VN  from    and     we get  ) 1 ( ) 2 (
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where   . 2 1 ω ω δ − =  
In any time period     given an offer   , t ( ) q p,  ,  δ   and his     the function     
indicates whether the middleman will agree to the trade or not. If the realized value 
, S (.) Z
Z  is 
greater than zero, then the middleman will say Yes, otherwise he will say No. We use this 
observation about Z in our estimation procedure, but before we do so, let us discuss the 
available data. 
 
1.3   Data 
 
Australia auctioned a portion of its import quotas on some 22 categories of 
textiles, clothing, and footwear during 1982--93. The auctions were held once a year, 
approximately six months in advance of the quota year
4. Prospective bidders had to 
register prior to the auctions; individuals, partnerships, domestic corporations, and 
foreign businesses represented by an Australian citizen were all eligible to bid. Bidders 
specified the category of the items, the quantity they were bidding for, and the ad 
valorem duty rate they would pay, above the duty rate otherwise applicable to the item. 
                                                 
4The quota year ran from March through February. For example, the auction for 1990 quota year licenses 
was held in the last quarter of 1989; those licenses became valid on March 1, 1990. 
 Successful bidders had to pay a security deposit equal to 10 percent of the estimated 
value of imports, where the valuation was based on the average unit value of imports for 
the category over the most recent twelve-month period for which data were available. 
When the goods were imported, each quota holder paid, in addition to the base duty rates, 
the extra ad valorem charge determined in the auction. Once the quota licenses had been 
used to import, the quota holder would receive a refund of the corresponding security 
deposit. Importers who failed to fully utilize their quota forfeited their security deposit. 
This security deposit was lowered to 5 percent in 
5   . 1992
 
Quota licenses obtained by auction were transferable to a certain extent
6. 
However, the secondary market was quite thin, and a number of quota brokerage firms 
sprang up that specialized in buying and selling these licenses. When quota was 
transferred, the new quota holder was required to submit the security deposit and the 
seller received a refund of the security deposit that had been paid. 
 
Our dataset consists of the transactions (purchases and sales, quantities and 
prices) of an Australian quota brokerage firm during 1989-1992, involving some 20 
categories of quota licenses
7. (Transactions involving licenses for a particular quota year 
could take place before the start of that quota year since, as noted above, the official 
auctions were held well in advance of the quota year.). However for this empirical 
exercise we restrict our attention to  7  categories for which there are a large number of 
transactions in a quota year and to quota years 1989 and 1992. Both 1989 and 1992 have 
the best quality of data. Moreover there was a shift in the security deposit rate
8 from 10 
percent in 1989 to 5 percent of unit value of imports in 1992. Table 1.1 shows that the 
unit values for both years. While the unit values vary over the years, most of the variation 
                                                 
5 During the same time, New Zealand auctioned off quota licenses to convert quotas to tariffs. MacAfee, 
Takacs, Vincent and Takacs (1999) discuss the case of New Zealand.  
6Further details on Australia's textile, clothing, and footwear quota system may be found in Takacs (1994). 
7 This data was collected by Wendy Takacs and we are grateful to her for making it available to us. 
8 Some other years pose problems of changes in policy within the year. For example in 1990, the security 
deposit was waived midway during the year. In 1991, the deposit was waived but we still observe negative 
prices which one would expect to result from importers trying to sell their stock to get back their security 
deposits.  The years 1989 and 1992 do not suffer from these problems. 
 between the two years in the security deposit paid by importers comes from the halving 
of the security deposit rate. The number of transactions in 1992 are much larger than in 
1989 for most commodities. Moreover while in 1989, one observes  transactions at 
negative prices, we observe none for 1992 (Negative prices can occur because of security 
deposits that need to be paid: people may pay to get rid of their stock  to get their deposit 
back). In macro economic terms, both 1989 and 1992 were somewhat similar in that 
Australia was going through a recessionary phase. Unemployment rates were high 6% in 
1989 and 10% in 1992.  The exchange rate (US $/ Aus $) in 1989 was 0.78 and it was 
0.73 in 1992. While the quota level allocated through auctions varied over these years, 
two things needed to be pointed out: First, there was a gradual move from base quota 
(that were allocated based on history of the importer) to quota allocated through tender. 
So there was some reallocation. However, according to the 1989–92 TCF assistance plan, 
both base and tender quota were transferable.” (IAC Annual Report 1986–87, p. 118.)]. 
Thus greater trade was not because of this reallocation. Secondly, the prices that the 
quota licenses trade at are percentage over base rates. Thus a change in quota level should 
not affect the license price through the scarcity value at all. 
 
Absent information on the broker's stock of licenses at any point in time, we 
constructed initial stock on the assumption that he could not sell licenses he did not hold
9. 
Hence, we assume the broker starts each year with at least one license in each category, 
and that his stock never falls below one
10. We denote stock at beginning of time t  as      . t S
 
The transaction book reports prices at which trade took place. We take into 
account the deposit rate as this should be factored in to calculate net prices. We add the 
                                                 
S B t
t q q D τ τ τ − = ∑ =0
9 Specifically, the broker's initial stock of licenses (i.e., his stock of licenses before the start of trading for a 
particular quota year) is calculated in the following way. For a given category and quota year, let  
)  , i.e., the cumulative difference, up to period  t  , of quantities bought and sold by the 





t q [ ] t D min  denote the smallest value of     over all  t  . If  
  is positive, then initial stock for that category and quota year is set at 1. If     is negative, 
then initial stock for that category and quota year is set at 1- 
t D
[] t D min [] t D min
[ ] t D min  . His stock of licenses at the 
beginning of period     (i.e., his stock of licenses at the end of period   t 1 − t   ) is thus his initial stock plus 
cumulative purchases less sales up to   1 − t  : .  . 1 0 − + = t t D Stock Stock  
10This assumption is arbitrary. We could just as well have assumed any non negative starting stock. deposit rate to both the selling and buying price. This is clearly what is required as when 
an importer (or the middleman) buys, he has to pay the price as well as the security 
deposit and Sellers get back their security deposit when they sell. 
 
 
1.4  Approximation of Q(.) 
 
  As pointed above, we do not explicitly solve the dynamic problem. Our model of 
the middleman tells us that when Z>0 the middleman says “Yes” and when Z<0  he says 
“No”.  Recall from (6) that 
 
) ; 1 , ( ) : 1 , ( ) , , , , ( Ω + − Ω + ′ − + + ′ = t S Q t q S Q q p S t q p Z δ ω  
 
However we do not have an analytical form for Q( ). So following Geweke and Keane, 
we take a second degree polynomial approximation for Q. Let us represent the 
approximation of Q(S,t: ) by the function F(S,t,  Ω Ω). Recall that Q(.,.) is a function of 
only the deterministic variable S and t conditional on the distribution parameters. This is 
because of our independence assumptions where realizations of random variables in 
period t do not give any information about their values in the next period.  However for 
our empirical exercise, we do not know what the distribution parameters are. So we need 
to include the distribution parameters in a second degree taylor approximation given by 
the function F(S,t, Ω). Let  ( ) ' Ω ≡ t S X . Therefore 
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1
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where P  is a symmetric matrix with second derivates as diagonal elements and cross 
partials as off diagonal elements;   is a row vector of first derivatives of Q with respect 
to elements of  .
Ω Q
Ω
Substituting Q(S-q’, t+1: ) and Q(S,t+1:  Ω Ω) by their approximations and noting that 
the only thing difference between the two functions is the stock (see Appendix B for full 
derivation), we get    {} () { } ) 1 )( ' ( '
2
1
) ' ( ) , , , . (
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where   (i,j=S, t) are second derivatives and cross partials and    is a vector of cross 
partials with respect to the elements of
ij Q Ω S Q
Ω. In our data, p, q, S and t vary over time. 
However given our time invariant distributions, we have no variation in the distribution 
parameters. Hence it is not possible to separately identify elements of   and  . All 
we can hope to do is to estimate the linear combination of the terms in front of q’. Thus 
we rewrite 
Ω S Q S Q
) , , , , ( S t q p Z ω  as 
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This form is in the same spirit as Geweke and Keane who take their approximations as a 
function of  only deterministic variables which vary over time.  
 
  The identification of the distribution parameters comes from the observed prices 
and quantities, the distributional assumptions and the choices of the middleman. We 
discuss this in the next section. 
 
1.5   The Empirical Model and Identification 
 
  The model above gives us a formulation that we can take to data. Note however 
that  δ ,  while known to the middleman, is not known to us. So we assume that   
  At any point in time     we observe whether trade takes place or not. If 
trade takes place we know Z>0 though we do not observe the value of Z. If trade did not 
take place, that could be because the middleman did not meet an importer or because the 
offer by the importer was not attractive enough to the middleman. When the middleman 
meets a trader and no trade occurs, we know it must be that Z<0 though as above, we do 
not observe the value of Z.   
). , (
2
δ δ σ µ δ N ∼ , t 
Given these we can identify parameters of our approximation and the distributions 
using the strategy explained below. It is very important to note here that none of the steps 
described below are independent of each other and that they have to be mutually 
consistent helps us identify the system as a whole. So each step implicitly assumes “given 
everything else”. 
 
  To start with, note that anytime we talk about Z, we assume that   
Let us assume, initially, that we know all the prices and quantities. How likely is it that 
the middleman said No depends on how likely it is that 
). , (
2
δ δ σ µ δ N ∼
0 < Z .  The distribution of δ  
tells us how likely. For example 
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where   is a normal cdf.  (.) 2 , δ δ σ µ Φ
When  trade does take place at (p,q), stock  S and time t, we know that Z<0.  Thus given 
our data, (p,q,t,St) when there is a transaction we know that 
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This step gives us some information on what the   s could be.  * i θ
  
  To identify the price and quantity distributions, notice that these are the price and 
quantity offers that prevail in the economy. The observed price and quantities, when there 
is trade, helps us identify part of the distribution. The unobserved price and quantities are 
pinned down by the dynamic problem (recall they must be such that  0 < Z ). With these two 
parts, the price and quantity distributions in the economy are identified. Given everything 
else, there is a unique value of probability of meeting, λ  , that maximizes the likelihood function
11. 
 
   Following Geweke and Keane, we use Bayesian inference via Gibbs Sampling 
data augmentation techniques to estimate the parameters of the model (For a discussion 
of application of bayesian inference to dynamic choice models see Geweke and Keane 
2000). While a detailed description of the method is given below, in short Gibbs 
sampling makes it easy to calculate expectations of functions. The method of data 
augmentation refers to adding data to cases when they are not observed by drawing them 
from distributions.  Bayesian inference via Gibbs Sampling data augmentation techniques 
has found to used to estimate a large number of discrete choice problems (Wong and 
Tanner). 
 
The first step in the process requires us to form the “complete data” likelihood 
function. This is the likelihood function that could be formed if we observed the value 
function differences    , the complete set of buying and selling prices including the ones 
when there is no buy or sell
12 and days when the middleman met an importer     Given 




δ  , the distribution of buyers and sellers, the distribution of meetings, and our data, 
we can form the "complete data" likelihood function. Define  









t q p q p I q p q p I q p S S B B Σ
−
Σ
− − + =
µ µ φ φ ϕ  
All this says is that when   we draw prices and quantity from a log normal buying 











                                                 
11 We are not as confident of λ  as other parameters as we do not have variables to properly identify it. We 
also estimated a model where λ  was assumed to be 1. The results obtained were similar to the ones 
obtained here where we allow it to be anything positive less than 1.  
12This includes knowledge of whether the middleman met a buy or seller, i.e.   . 
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 TR  refers to all dates when we observe trades.     refers to periods where there is no 
trade.     is an indicator function reflecting that     when there is a trade. 
The first part refers to when the middleman trades while the latter part refers to when we 
see no trade. The latter part includes both the possibilities: that the middleman did not 
meet anyone as well as the possibility of unfavorable offers. 
NTR
) 0 ( ≥ Z Ind 0 > Z
 
If we start with flat priors, the joint density of parameters  ( ), ,
2
δ σ θ′   the unknown 
days of meeting (    when    , the unknown identity of the importer     when  
 , the price and quantity when there is no trade  
t I ) NTR t ∈
B
t I (
) NTR t ∈ ( ) NTR t q p t t ∈  when  ,   and the 
value function differences (    w h e n    t Z ) NTR t ∈   are proportional to the likelihood 
function in     It is not feasible to construct the posterior analytically due to large 
number of integrations required over the unobservables. But we can simulate draws from 
the posterior using a Gibbs sampling data augmentation method. The method entails 
factoring the joint posterior into a series of conditional densities that are easier to draw 
from. We draw cyclically from these distributions, one at a time. For a large number of 
such cycles, the draws obtained converge in distribution to that of the complete joint 




  We make these draws in the following steps. We start with initial guesses for 
parameters and unknowns. When we draw a variable or variables, we keep all others variables to their values in the last cycle. Then 
Step 1:We draw     s for when there is trade and     and     jointly when there is no 
trade. 
t Z t I t Z
Step 2: We draw missing prices and quantities  ( ) t t q p ,   as well as the identity of the 
traders (   .  )
B
t I
Step 3: We draw parameters that determine the     function as well as  f δ µ .  
For this we rewrite (7) as 
[ ]
′
+ + − − + − + − + = −
′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′
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2 2
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where   . 0 ) ( ) ( = − = ′ δ µ δ δ E E   
We draw  ( ). , , , 3 2 1
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Step 4 We draw    and     
B Σ
S Σ
Step 5 We draw     and     
B µ
S µ
Step 6: We draw     
2
η σ
Step 7: We draw     
B λ
Step 8: We draw  λ   
We return to Step 1. 
Each step is explained in detail in the appendix. 
 
1.6 Results 
1.6.1 The Middleman’s problem:  
 
The profit maximization decision to agree or not agree to trade, according to our 
model, depends on Stock, time to end of the quota year and the offers made. Our results 
bear out the importance of all three.  
 
At any given point, we would expect that higher the stock, the higher the expected 
value at the beginning of any time period, represented by the function Q(.) as the 
middleman can always ignore the extra stock. So he cannot be worse off. We have taken 












Results in Table 1.2 show that while     and     are usually negative,     is positive. 











 depends on the relative magnitude of the three terms. Table 7 reports the 





. These have been calculated using the highest value of t and the 
highest value of S in our data (which would tend to make the expression negative). We 
find that with the exception of one case, it is positive for all other cases.  
  
We are however unable to check any other properties of the value function. We 
have estimated  the difference of value functions V
Y and V
N and thus some common terms 
of the approximation F(.) cancel out and we cannot recover them. Hence instead of 
concentrating on properties of the value function, we focus on the middleman’s decision 
to agree or not agree to a trade.  Conditional on getting an offer to buy or sell licenses, the 
probability that the middleman agrees to the offer is given by . Note that 
given our notation, when the middleman buys, q<0. Our results shed light on how this 
decision, conditional on receiving an offer, depends on Stock and time to end of the year. 
If we differentiate the   with respect to   ,  we get 
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This marginal effect of time on the probability of selling is positive since q’>0 and   is 
negative, while the effect is negative for a buy (q’<0) (Since 
∗
1 θ
(.) φ   is a density it is 
always positive). This makes sense as the middleman is more willing to buy in the earlier 
time periods while at the end, the middleman is more inclined to sell. This makes sense as 
in finite horizon problem, this is expected to be true. 
 
  Moreover whether the middleman agrees to buy or sell also depends crucially on 
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Thus the probability of a buy depends negatively on the price (the middleman is more 
likely to say yes if price is lower), negatively on time (as   is negative) and negatively 
on stock and the size of q
B (as   is negative). In other words, the higher the stock and 
the larger the size of q





  When the middleman sells, q’=Min(q
S,S). The marginal effect of a higher selling 
quantity on the probability of saying yes is given by 
) ( 2 ) 1 (
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The probability of saying Yes to a sale is higher the greater the price offered, the 
higher is t and the higher is S and lower is q
S. 
 
These results show the workings of an active inventory accumulation model. The 
middleman behaves optimally and chooses his reservation prices to maximize his profit. 
Table 1.6 shows the derived means of the buying and selling price distributions and the 
means of prices in actual trades. The middleman sells when the selling price offers are 
high and buying prices are low. Note that these are always higher than the mean of their 
respective distributions. This is more pronounced for most categories in   One 
reason why this might be so, is the larger variance in prices in 1989 as compared to 
. The higher security deposits of   were causing people to trade (sometimes at 
negative prices) to avoid paying the penalty, which increased the variance. The higher 







 1.6.2 Behavior of Importers: 
 
The price, quantity distributions that have been estimated reflect the market that 
the middleman faces. It would be interesting to ask if these prices reflect true valuation of 
the licenses. To start with, let us remind ourselves that usually we expect sellers, on an 
average, to have low valuation and buyers, on an average, to be customers who value the 
license higher
13. If the price distributions reflected true valuation, the mean of the buying 
price distribution (note that the middleman’s buying price distribution is the mean of 
prices offered by the sellers in the economy), should not be lower than his selling price 
distribution (the mean of prices offered by the buyers).  However Table 1.6 shows us that 
this is not always the case. In many cases the mean of buying price distribution is higher 
than the selling price distribution, for example, categories 601, 602 in 1989, categories 
610, 616 in 1992. For this to happen, it must be that importers are quoting prices different 
from their valuation. In particular, when a buyer wants to buy from a middleman, he 
offers a price lower than his true valuation to elicit a profit from the transaction. Similarly 
a seller would try to sell at a price higher than his valuation.  
 
Notice that the extent to which importers can sell at a price above their valuation 
and buy at below their valuation depends partly on the prices that are acceptable to the 
middleman. In particular, the middleman’s reservation prices, i.e. prices which make the 
middleman indifferent between trading and not trading, are crucial to an importers 
decision. But these prices depend on how much stock the middleman has; something that 
importers do not know. Hence the importers quote prices based on a probability 
distribution of the middleman’s reservation buying and selling price. Let u represent the 
valuation of the license to importers. Let  
B R  and 
S R  represent the middleman’s 












I R p prob q u p < ∗ ∗ −  while buyers set a price   to maximize 
B
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I R p prob q p u > ∗ ∗ − . Let F
B(.) and F
S(.) denote the distribution function of the 
                                                 
13 In a standard demand analysis think of buyers being on the demand curve and sellers as the supply curve. 
Then buyers are usual higher valuation customers and sellers are lower valuations customers. middleman’s reservation buying and selling price respectively. Let   and   
denote the respective density functions. Thus necessary conditions for optimal selling and 































u p − =  
Thus sellers will price higher than their valuation while buyers will offer lower 
that their valuations. The extent to which they do so depends on reservation price 
distribution and density functions. It is possible then, for some distributions, that the 
mean of prices offered by the sellers will be greater than those offered by the buyers. 
 
. Given our data, we have no idea what the probability distribution of reservation 
prices are. We thus simulate the valuation distribution implied by one possible 
distribution: The empirical distribution of reservation prices. We assume all importers 
perceive the same distribution for the middleman's reservation buying and selling prices 
as they have no idea what the middleman's stock is.  
 
We use the distribution of reservation prices implied by the actual stock levels 
over time. Recall that the reservation prices are prices for which  . 0 = Z   This implies 
 








S q S q q t
R
′
+ + − − + − + − + −
=
′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′ ∗ δ µ θ θ θ δ
2 2
3 2 1 ) ( ) ( ) )( 1 (
(.)  
 
where   We derive   for  { . . ,S B i∈ } (.)
i R T t , 1 =  and actual stocks in our data   We use 
the estimated values of parameters, draws of   and 
{}
T
t t S 1 =
i q δ′ from the estimated distributions. 
We derive two sets of reservation prices, one for buys and one for sales. For each set of 
reservation prices, 
i R , we find the empirical distribution, that is the proportion of times 
 where    is a positive number. We use the two distributions as the reservation 
price distributions. Using these two distributions, we take T   draws of prices and find the 
a R
i < avaluation distribution
14. 
 
The results from the simulation results are shown in Table 1.10. Clearly the mean 
valuation of buyers is much higher than those of sellers in all cases, suggesting that our 
results are consistent with a model where buyers, on an average, have higher valuation 
than sellers. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show output of one such simulation exercise for 
Category 602. Simulations suggest that the buying reservation prices in 1989 (Figure 
1.2). tended to be, on an average, lower than the valuation of the sellers. In such a 
situation, sellers are looking at the tail of the reservation price distributions and find it 
optimal to quote prices relatively higher than their valuations as there is not too much 
loss (in terms of lower probability of the middleman agreeing to the trade) in doing so
15. 
This is in contrast to 1992 (Figure 1.3), where the means of the valuation and reservation 
price distributions are close Thus the costs to charging a price much higher than 
valuation, in terms of much lower probability that the middleman will agree, are greater . 
Thus there is a much smaller spread between the price and valuation for sellers. Table 
1.11 shows that this spread is, for most categories, greater in 1989 than in 1992. 
 
Similarly Figure 1.2 suggests that in 1989, the buyers offered prices much lower 
than valuations, as the reservation price to sell, as compared to valuations, was much 
lower. While, in Figure 1.3, prices are on average lower in 1992 (because of the lower 
security deposit), they are not too much lower than the valuations. Table 1.11 shows that 
this difference between 1989 and 1992 bears out for buyers in many other categories too.  
 
1.6.3 Welfare Analysis: 
 
If there are very few middlemen in a market where importers don’t meet each 
other very often (thin markets), the middlemen have market power. They exercise their 
                                                 
14 The derived reservation distributions are not nice. So second order conditions may not be met. Therefore 
we use grid search to find valuations that justify the observed prices. We also check if any of the prices are 
consistent with a zero valuation for sellers. Simulations show that are usually not! For one or two cases that 
justified by negative valuations, we assume valuations are zero. 
 
15 Note that the sellers will charge a price at least equal to their valuation. market power by restricting the number of trades that can take place. In our model where 
importers arrive with offers, the middleman exercises his power by agreeing to buy and 
sell only at prices favorable to him
16. His decisions, as we have seen above, depends on 
how much stock he has and how much time is left to the end of the quota year. To 
conduct a welfare analysis, we also need to infer how much the importers value the good. 
However as we have seen above, prices should not be used as proxies for valuations. In 
this section we try to look at the welfare consequences of having such a market where 
middleman and customers both have some market power.  
 
To examine the effect of the security deposit we calculate the loss in welfare 
relative to perfect competition. Merely comparing surplus under the two security regimes 
is erroneous as when the security changes, market conditions, as given by distribution of 
buyers and sellers, changes. Thus the demand and supply curves change and the perfect 
competitive outcome itself changes. Hence there is a need to normalize the surpluses to 
what could be attained relative to perfect competition. Figure 1.4 explains what we seek 
to do. The valuations of buyers and sellers yield the demand and supply curves under 
perfect competition and the surplus is given by AFI. However as importers do not price 
according to their true valuations, the price offered by the buyers and sellers yield the 
pseudo demand and supply curves. For buyers, prices are lower than valuation and for 
sellers, prices are higher than valuation. Thus at any price, there are fewer sellers than in 
a competitive market. Similarly at any given price, there are fewer buyers. In addition, 
the middleman buys at a lower price than he sells at creating a wedge in the buying and 
selling price.  Hence only an amount Q
MM rather than Q
PC is traded in the market. Thus 
the total loss in the secondary market, as compared to perfect competition is given by 
ADE.  
 
Using our estimates, we seek to calculate the area ADE as a percentage of AFI. 
However perfect competition in our set up is not so obvious as the problem is non 
stationary.  
                                                 
16 In a scenario where middlemen post prices, they maintain a wedge between the buying and selling price 
to earn profits. This leads to welfare losses for society. See Krishna et. al (2004).  
To find ADE, we need Q
MM. Since the quantity bought and sold are not equal, the 
choice of Q
MM is difficult. So instead, we use the T prices, quantities and valuations used 
to derive AFI. We then simulate the T period model with the middleman to derive the 
producer and consumer surplus and the profit. We subtract the total surplus obtained from 
AFI to get a measure of ADE. This not a perfect measure but captures our intentions. 
 
Table 1.7 shows that, as expected, there is always a deadweight loss with a 
middleman as compared to a frictionless markets. These losses range from     to 
about    . There are two sources of losses in these markets: one emanates from the 
seller quoting prices higher than their valuation and buyers shading their buying price. In 
figure 1.4, this loss is denoted by the area ABC. The other source of loss is because of the 
middleman’s optimal behavior. In the absence of the middleman, if the importers 
behaved as described above, there would still be one market clearing price. But the 
middleman extracts profit by creating a wedge between the price he pays for his 
purchases and sales. By doing so, he restricts the number of trades in the market causing 




Table 1.7 suggests a relation between number of trades the middleman undertakes 
and the extent of the deadweight loss. If one looks at the same categories for different 
years, there is a clear relationship between the number of trades and the extent of 
deadweight loss. In particular the higher the number of trades, the lower the deadweight 
loss. As Figure 1.4 shows, the primary loss of the secondary market as compared to 
perfect competition comes through curtailment of the number of trades. The further Q
MM 
is from the perfect competition level of output, the higher the losses. The number of 
trades is a proxy for the amount of quantity that is transacted in a market.  
 
The year 1989 has lower number of trades. But 1989 was the year the 10% 
security deposit rule was in place! Throughout the period of our study, the market 
conditions were nearly the same. As we have pointed earlier, the market conditions affect 
the base rate and therefore the secondary market prices are not affected by them. The reason for the losses seems to emanate from the change in distribution of buyers and 
sellers and the middleman’s optimal reaction to these changes in distribution. Our 
estimates in Table 1.5 show that for most categories, the middleman’s probability of 
meeting a seller (probability of buying) given by   was much higher in 1989, consistent 
with the idea that in 1989, there were a large number of sellers. While in 1989, sellers 
were trying to sell off their license, sometimes at negative prices (net of security deposit) 
to regain their security deposit, the proportion of buyers were fewer. Given the smaller 
proportion of buyers, the middleman was not willing to buy licenses. As we see in Figure 
3, this meant that the sellers were looking at the tail of the reservation price distribution 
while deciding their selling prices. The optimal behavior in such a case resulted in 
importers trying to sell at prices much higher than their valuation, hoping to extract some 
surplus. Similarly, the buyers were trying to quote prices much lower than their valuation 
to secure the license because they knew that the middleman would want to get rid of the 
license to get the deposits back. Table 1.11 shows that within each category group, the 
difference between valuation and price for both buyers and sellers tended to be larger in 
1989.  This behavior by the importers, coupled with the middleman waiting for favorable 
trades to maximize profit, led to fewer trades in 1989 and greater losses.  Thus we can 
argue that security deposit, through changing the distribution of importers adversely 





This paper looks at the effect of a change in security deposit policy on a 
secondary market where there are no centralized clearing markets: thus there are a few 
middlemen who coordinate transactions among buyers and sellers. Using data from 1989 
and 1992 in Australia on one such middleman, we content that the change in deposit rate 
from 10% in 1989 to 5% in 1992 affected the secondary market for licenses.  
 
To understand how middlemen behave in such markets, we model one such 
middleman's dynamic profit maximization exercise. When customers, also called 
importers, come to the middleman they announce a price-quantity offer to buy or sell. Given the offer the middleman either agrees or refuses to trade. There are two factors that 
effect the middleman's decision. First the middleman must find it consistent with his 
optimal inventory decision. Second the middleman must find the prices attractive enough 
to trade at. These two factors imply that there will be a large number of trades that do not 
take place and cause inefficiency as compared to a frictionless market. 
 
The transactions data that are recorded suffer from endogenous sampling 
problem. As has been noted above, the transactions data only reflects the trades that the 
middleman found attractive. We correct for the endogenous sampling problem in the 
estimation procedure. Our results show that this is indeed a serious problem as the mean 
of the distribution of prices that sellers offer is above the mean of actual buying prices of 
the middleman. On the other hand, the mean of distribution of the prices that the buyers 
offers is below the actual selling price of the middleman.  
 
Estimation results yield that the value function is increasing in stock and 
decreasing over time. The results are consistent with an inventory accumulation model, 
wherein the middleman is more inclined to buy when the stock is low and to sell when 
the stock is high. Moreover, consistent with a finite horizon dynamic problem, we find 
that the middleman is more inclined to buy when there is a lot of time left to the end of 
the quota year, while is more inclined to sell in the end. 
 
A further inefficiency in such markets comes from diversion of valuation from 
prices. The buying and selling price offers of the customers do not necessarily reveal true 
valuation for the license. In particular, buyers tend to quote prices lower than their 
valuation while sellers tend to ask for prices above their valuation to elicit some gain 
from the trade. The extent to which they can do so depend on the reservation prices that 
the middleman sets. The reservation prices depend to a large extent on the stock that the 
middleman possesses but importers do not know the inventory holdings of the 
middleman. They therefore decide the optimal prices to quote using a distribution of the 
middleman's reservation prices. We conduct simulations using the empirical distribution 
of reservation prices as implied by the middleman's actual stock over the trading period. Given these distributions, we derive the valuation distribution from the price distributions 
in the economy. Our results show that buyers do tend to quote prices lower than valuation 
and sellers prices higher than their valuation. An interesting result from the estimation of 
the price distribution is that for some categories and years, the mean of the seller’s price 
distributions is higher than that of the buyers. However when we recover the valuation 
distributions, we obtain that, as expected, the buyers have on an average higher valuation 
than the sellers. This is reassuring and flies in the face of studies that tend to use the 
resale prices in the secondary markets as a proxy for the real valuation of the good! 
 
Using the valuation distributions derived, we do simulations to conduct a welfare 
analysis to compare a secondary market with such a middleman to a perfectly 
competitive market. We find that the welfare losses range from 20% to 87% of the 
surplus under perfect competition. Within the same category, we find that in 1989 the 
losses are greater than in 1992. We argue that the higher security deposit might be 
responsible for these losses in the secondary market. Our analysis shows that that the 
number of the trades undertaken by the middleman is lesser in 1989 than 1992. The lower 
number of trades leads to the welfare losses. 
 
The reason for lower trades is due to two interrelated factors. Our estimates show that 
the higher security deposit in 1989 led to a larger proportion of sellers than buyers. Given 
the lower probability of meeting a buyer, the middleman was hesitant to buy and willing 
to sell. Given this, sellers expected the middleman’s reservation buying prices to be 
skewed towards low prices. Thus most sellers were choosing prices in the right tail of the 
reservation price distribution and found it optimal to charge prices much higher than their 
valuation. Buyers, knowing that the middleman was eager to sell quoted prices much 
lower than their valuation. Moreover, the middleman too behaved optimally and given his 
stock, traded when he got favorable prices. These two factors implied that a large number 
of trades did not take place. 
 
The change in the security deposit rate in 1992 changed the distribution of importers. 
There were now a greater proportion of buyers, prices were on an average lower and there was lower variance in the prices. Hence the middleman was more inclined to trade, 
since buying offers were more frequent and given their lower variance, there was less 
advantage in waiting. The difference in the importers price and valuation was lower, 
hence larger number of trades took place leading to lower losses. 
 
Thus our analysis indicates that collecting security deposits, which was envisioned as 
a useful policy for preventing frivolous bidding, had harmful effects in the secondary 
market. The cutting of the rate alleviated some of these harmful effects in 1992. 
 
  It is important to note here that higher prices and lower quantity in 1989 can also 
come from a competitive model. Suppose importers (the customers of the middleman) are 
differentiated in two dimensions: the certainty with which they expect an order and the 
profit they expect to make from that order. The two characteristics are likely to be 
negatively correlated: high profit orders are risky while low profits are more certain. With 
a large security deposit, the licenses in the auction tend to go to those who are relatively 
sure of their order since there is a large penalty associated with non utilization. Hence 
there is less supply of licenses with a large deposit rate. Demand for licenses comes from 
those with unexpected profitable orders. But as these do not get the allocation in the 
auction with a high deposit, we expect demand for licenses to shift out. If this is less than 
the shift in of supply the price rises and quantity falls. However a preliminary look at the 
data for the middleman suggests that there was a large wedge between the actual buying 
and selling price, which seems to indicate that this was not a competitive market. Hence 
we chose to model the secondary market with frictions caused by middleman and 
importers. 
 
  It would be interesting to integrate the effect of the security deposit on the 
primary market; the bidding behavior itself to the changing distribution of importers in 
the secondary market. However this necessities the study of bidding behavior in a multi 
unit uniform price auction, the format for auctions in Australia. Studying such an auction 
and evaluating the effect on both markets in an integrated framework is an issue we hope 
to study in the future. References 
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Appendix 
Step1 
•  When there is trade, with everything known 
draw     from   t Z [ ] ) , ) ( ) ( ) )( 1 ( (
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where     denotes that the normal density is truncated from below at     This can be 
drawn using an inverse CDF method. 
+ N . 0
•  When there is no trade,  
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3 2 1 η δ σ µ θ θ θ + − − + − + − + +
′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′ −
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  denotes that the normal density is truncated from above at     We use a simple 
inverse CDF method. 
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To draw  I   we use an acceptance rejection (A/R) algorithm. The above density function 
is the target density function. We take the sampling density function as     and 
denote it by     The acceptance probability in the A/R algorithm is given by   
t t I I − −
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Step 2 
•  When there is no trade, given everything else, if   , 1 = t I   the missing   p  s and  
B I   are jointly drawn from 
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as the sampling distribution in an A/R algorithm. The acceptance probability is given by  ). ) , 1 , , ( (
, δ µ θ φ − ′ + − −
′ ′ t q S f q p Z t t t t t 2 0 δ σ   Note that if   , 0 = t I   that is there is no meeting, 
then we draw p, q  and  
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We take all the periods where there was a meeting, i.e. when   1 = t I  . Let     denote the 
number of periods when the middleman meets a trader. Let  
∗ T
∗ Z  denote a     X    
matrix where the  t  th element is  
∗ T 1
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follow         Note that the mean is just a simple OLS 
estimator. 
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Step 4 
Let B be number of buys and S be the number of sells. To draw  
B Σ   let     be a     X  
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17If the importer did not meet the middleman, there is no data (like decision of  Yes   or    ) that gives 
us information additional to that contained in  
No
ϕ  . However there is a need to draw them from the 
distribution because when  Z   is drawn in Step  1  , we need information on prices and quantity even if  I   
was     in the previous iteration.  0
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Step 6 
With everything else known,   δ σ   has an inverted gamma distribution. Since   
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Step 7 































































I T βAppendix B 
Let 0 be a vector of 0s. Let us approximate the function around X
0=(0,0,0). Let Q
0 denote 
the function evaluated at X
0 Therefore  
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Expanding and collecting terms: 
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TABLES 




601: 1989  8.3
601: 1992  6.9
602: 1989  2.9
602: 1992  2.55
603: 1989  5.15
603: 1992  4.4
604: 1989  20.95
604: 1992  22.5
606: 1989  6.9
606: 1992  6.7
610: 1989  5.8
610: 1992  4
616: 1989  17.25
616: 1992  14.2
  
Table 1.2: Parameter estimates 
Cat/Years Theta*(1) Theta*(2) Theta*(3) Constant 
601: 1989  -0.89 1.46 -0.25  -0.05 
   0.47 0.13 0.08 0.01 
1992  -0.38 0.42 0.01  -0.02 
   0.11 0.02 0.01  0.005 
602: 1989  0.36  0.57 -0.06  -0.04 
   0.37 0.06 0.05  0.008 
1992  -0.19 0.31 -0.02  -0.02 
   0.08 0.03  0.007  0.005 
603: 1989  -0.91 0.73 -0.23  -0.02 
   0.32 0.12 0.22  0.471 
1992  -0.06 0.33 -0.02  -0.006 
   0.10 0.03 0.03  0.002 
604: 1989  -4.25 4.58 0.62  -0.02 
   2.58 1.14 5.79  0.004 
1992  -1.23 1.72 0.32  -0.013 
   0.23 0.10 0.20  0.003 
606: 1989  -0.30 0.69 0.16 -0.04 
   0.30 0.20 0.06  0.006 
1992  -0.14 0.43 -0.01  -0.01 
   0.11 0.03 0.02  0.002 
610: 1989  -0.40 0.81 0.04  -0.01 
   0.23 0.09 0.04  0.005 
1992  -0.17 0.41 -0.02  -0.01 
   0.16 0.04 0.01  0.003 
616: 1989  -0.12  4.43  1.33  -0.10 
   2.07 0.78 1.38  0.012 
1992 0.15  0.85 0.15  -0.03 
   0.43 0.13 0.06 0.01 
 
Note: Bold values represent that 0 does not lie in 5-95% 
interval 
The values in italics are the standard errors calculated 









p µ  
 
S








2 σ    Cov. 
601: 1989  -0.16  -3.73  0.14  3.64  0.0010 
   0.09 0.41  0.04  1.1421  0.03 
1992 -0.79  -4.87  0.03  2.88  0.0003 
   0.03 0.26  0.01  0.5310  0.01 
602: 1989  -0.55  -4.20  0.10  4.17  0.0004 
   0.06 0.38  0.03  1.0217  0.03 
1992 -1.42  -3.94  0.12  4.66  0.0010 
   0.05 0.29  0.03  0.8866  0.04 
603: 1989  -0.44  -5.39  0.10  2.85  0.0009 
   0.06  0.30  0.03  0.6764  0.03 
1992 -1.06  -4.73  0.05  2.01  0.0004 
   0.02 0.14  0.01  0.2568  0.01 
604: 1989  1.20  -6.22  0.12  1.85  0.0007 
   0.06 0.22  0.03  0.4016  0.02 
1992 0.42  -5.64  0.05  1.86  0.0005 
   0.03 0.16  0.01  0.2766  0.01 
606: 1989  -0.01  -4.31  0.15  3.12  0.0009 
   0.05 0.22  0.03  0.5040  0.03 
1992 -0.70  -5.17  0.05  2.22  0.0006 
   0.02  0.16  0.01  0.3151  0.02 
610: 1989  -0.14  -4.71  0.08  2.87  0.0005 
   0.04 0.23  0.02  0.5270  0.02 
1992 -0.96  -4.47  0.09  2.50  0.0005 
   0.03 0.16  0.01  0.3649  0.02 
616: 1989  1.31  -4.64  0.20  1.28  0.0009 
   0.08  0.19  0.05  0.28  0.0228 
1992 0.21  -4.25  0.07  2.73  0.0005 
   0.03 0.19  0.01  0.42  0.02 
 











p µ  
 
B




2 σ  
B
q
2 σ    Cov 
601: 1989  0.001  -2.74  0.05  0.0012  0.007 
   0.057 0.01  0.01  0.001  0.0031 
1992 -0.862  -2.60  0.01  0.0002  0.001 
   0.019 0.003 0.0016  0.0001  0.0003 
602: 1989  -0.467  -2.47  0.10  0.0012  -0.010 
   0.075 0.01  0.02  0.001  0.0039 
1992 -1.484  -1.65  0.04  0.0007  0.005 
   0.046 0.01  0.01  0.0004  0.0016 
603: 1989  -0.482  -3.69  0.16  0.0020  -0.017 
   0.119 0.01  0.05  0.002  0.0075 
1992 -1.212  -3.18  0.02  0.0003  -0.002 
   0.024 0.003 0.004  0.0001  0.0006 
604: 1989  0.901  -5.64  0.57  0.0042  0.046 
   0.173 0.01  0.17  0.003  0.0206 
1992 0.395  -4.35  0.01  0.0002  -0.002 
   0.021  0.003  0.003  0.0001  0.0004 
606: 1989  0.052  -2.83  0.04  0.0007  0.005 
   0.048  0.01  0.01  0.0003  0.0017 
1992 -0.779  -3.12  0.03  0.0005  -0.004 
   0.042 0.01  0.01  0.0002  0.0012 
610: 1989  -0.155  -3.49  0.05  0.0008  0.006 
   0.054 0.01  0.01  0.0005  0.0020 
1992 -0.852  -2.92  0.11  0.0012  0.011 
   0.073 0.007  0.03  0.0007  0.0038 
616: 1989  1.337  -3.80  0.53  0.0029  0.037 
   0.138  0.01  0.13  0.002  0.0139 
1992 0.269  -2.94  0.07  0.0010  0.008 
   0.049  0.006  0.016  0.001  0.003 
 










Table 1.5: Other parameters 
Cat/Years 
 
    
 
    
 
    
601: 1989  0.76  0.98  0.0027 
   0.07 0.02  0.0016 
1992 0.43 0.98  0.0004 
  0.08 0.02  0.0002 
602: 1989  0.61  0.98  0.0015 
   0.08 0.02  0.0006 
1992 0.52 0.99  0.0008 
  0.07 0.01  0.0003 
603: 1989  0.57  0.98  0.0002 
   0.09 0.02  0.0001 
1992 0.26 0.99  0.0002 
  0.04 0.01  0.0001 
604: 1989  0.41  0.99  0.0005 
   0.07  0.01  0.0002 
1992 0.34 0.99  0.0002 
  0.05 0.01  0.0001 
606: 1989  0.36  0.99  0.0028 
   0.06 0.01  0.0007 
1992 0.35 0.99  0.0002 
  0.06 0.01  0.0001 
610: 1989  0.54  0.99  0.0003 
   0.07 0.01  0.0003 
1992 0.40 0.99  0.0006 
  0.06 0.01  0.0002 
616: 1989  0.30  0.98  0.0085 
   0.07 0.02  0.0016 
1992 0.49 0.99  0.0031 
   0.056 0.008  0.001 
B λ λ 2
' δ σ








Table 1.6: Comparison of means of actual prices and means of distributions 
















601: 1989  0.94  1.03    1.02  0.91 
601: 1992  0.42  0.42    0.47  0.46 
602: 1989  0.54  0.66    0.68  0.61 
602: 1992  0.21  0.23    0.29  0.26 
603: 1989  0.53  0.67    0.72  0.67 
603: 1992  0.30  0.30    0.37  0.35 
604: 1989  2.25  3.27    3.90  3.50 
604: 1992  1.45  1.49    1.69  1.56 
606: 1989  1.00  1.08    1.16  1.07 
606: 1992  0.44  0.47    0.53  0.51 
610: 1989  0.79  0.88    0.98  0.90 
610: 1992  0.36  0.45    0.42  0.40 
616: 1989  3.77  4.96    5.05  4.12 
616: 1992  1.21  1.36    1.35  1.28 
 
 








601:       1989  69  0.67 
1992 75 0.57 
602:       1989  76  0.85 
1992 109 0.77 
603:       1989  39  0.51 
1992 167 0.20 
604:       1989  88  0.69 
1992 147 0.57 
606:       1989  93  0.76 
1992 115 0.75 
610:       1989  129  0.44 
1992 149 0.24 
616:       1989  82  0.87 
1992 149 0.66 
 
 













601: 1989  0.21 
601: 1992  0.23 
602: 1989  0.51 
602: 1992  0.12 
603: 1989  0.17 
603: 1992  0.26 
604: 1989  5.88 
604: 1992  1.18 
606: 1989  1.08 
606: 1992  -0.23 
610: 1989  0.73 
610: 1992  0.39 
616: 1989  4.98 




Table 1.9: Buying Prices and Selling Price Means net of Security Deposit 
   Selling Price    Buying Price 
601: 1989  0.08    0.20 
601: 1992  0.11    0.08 
602: 1989  0.32    0.37 
602: 1992  0.13    0.10 
603: 1989  0.16    0.16 
603: 1992  0.13    0.08 
604: 1989  1.41    1.18 
604: 1992  0.43    0.37 
606: 1989  0.38    0.39 
606: 1992  0.18    0.13 
610: 1989  0.32    0.30 
610: 1992  0.20    0.25 
616: 1989  2.39    3.24 
616: 1992  0.57    0.65 
  
Table 1.10: Mean of Valuations 
  
Mean of Buyers 
Valuation    
Mean of Sellers 
Valuation 
601: 1989  1.71    0.64 
601: 1992  1.64    0.29 
602: 1989  2.00    0.43 
602: 1992  1.46    0.14 
603: 1989  2.13    0.42 
603: 1992  1.81    0.04 
604: 1989  6.80    1.04 
604: 1992  2.74    0.83 
606: 1989  2.31    0.50 
606: 1992  1.43    0.28 
610: 1989  1.84    0.47 
610: 1992  1.30    0.14 
616: 1989  7.80    0.41 
616: 1992  3.08    0.99 
 
 
Table 1.11: Difference between valuation and price offered 
Cat: Years  Sellers  Buyers 
601: 1989  0.39  0.80 
601: 1992  0.13  1.18 
602: 1989  0.23  1.39 
602: 1992  0.09  1.20 
603: 1989  0.25  1.46 
603: 1992  0.26  1.46 
604: 1989  2.23  3.30 
604: 1992  0.66  1.18 
606: 1989  0.58  1.24 
606: 1992  0.19  0.92 
610: 1989  0.41  0.94 
610: 1992  0.31  0.90 
616: 1989  4.55  3.68 
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  Price density of Sellers          Price density of buyers 
 





















































































































  Price density of Sellers          Price density of buyers 
 
The densities have been drawn on different panels to distinguish them. They have been drawn to the same scale. 
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